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Introduction
Cesare Beccaria had a dream: a rationally constructed criminal law system would prevent 
citizens from harmful conduct and would create “the greatest happiness shared among the 
greater number” (Beccaria 1995: 7). Through clear laws and proportionate punishments
this dream would come true. Unknown crimes, unfair trials and cruel punishments would 
belong to the past. Beccaria dreamt his dream in the 18th century, when Enlightenment 
had reached its highest point. Since this century, his rational desires are partially realized
in many legal systems by means of statutory crimes, fair trials and sentencing practices 
based on principles which have developed over the past two centuries.
Yet his dream did not come true. In recent criminological literature it is argued 
that the state has lost its monopoly on the “governance of security”. Private companies, 
organizations and citizens try to protect their own security through “networked 
governance” or “nodal governance” (Johnston and Shearing 2003, Wood and Dupont 
2006, Wood and Shearing 2007). The state is just a knot or “node” in the social network 
of the governance of security and the criminal law is no more than one of many 
instruments to protect the security of citizens and companies. Participants in the nodal 
governance are relatively less interested in the punishment of past conduct. The 
governance of security is mainly directed at reducing the risks of harmful conduct in the 
future. The punishment of crimes from the past can only be considered as an important 
state activity as long as it reduces the risks of future crimes.
The main reason Beccaria’s dream did not come true may be found in the failure
of the criminal law based on the rational principles of Beccaria’s theory. The official 
publications of criminal laws and the proportionate punishments of crimes are not enough 
to protect the security of all citizens in an effective way. In the risk society, individuals 
and companies demand much more security than the state can offer by means of the 
criminal law. Therefore, they look for alternative means for the failing state. Companies 
hire their own security personnel or they contract security companies to protect their 
security in so called “mass private properties” (sport stadiums, amusement parks, 
shopping malls, office buildings), they cooperate to protect their security in “business 
improvement districts” and they hire specialized companies or create special departments 
to reduce harmful conduct like fraud and theft by personnel and clients. Citizens who can 
afford it, withdraw themselves in “gated communities” with private security provisions,
or they develop their own strategies to protect security without the support of the state, 
for instance by surveillances of neighborhood watches and private alarms in their homes.
These social developments raise the question: what is left of Beccaria’s dream?
Are citizens still equally protected by the law and by fair trials and proportionate 
punishments? Beccaria’s dream was founded on principles of equality, legality and 
proportionality. Are these principles still effectively in force under the nodal governance 
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the criminal law: the concentration of power in the state monopoly on the criminal law is 
the most effective way to protect the security of all citizens in a fair and equal way. When 
these principles are abandoned, the effectivity and normativity of the governance of 
security become problematic: are the alternative arrangements of nodal governance 
capable of offering equal security to all citizens and are these arrangements effective in 
the sense that citizens are better protected than under the criminal law?
In this article I will presuppose that the shift from the state monopoly on the 
governance of security to the nodal governance of security indeed has taken place as 
some authors have argued, although this view has been met with criticism in 
criminological literature (Crawford 2006, Loader and Walker 2006, Loader and Walker 
2007). I will investigate which consequences this shift can have for the Beccarian ideals 
concerning the effectivity and normativity of the criminal law. I will analyze the main 
points of the Beccarian theory on the normative foundations of the criminal law and the 
effectivity of the state monopoly on the governance of security by means of the criminal 
law.
Before I will go into Beccaria’s dream, I will summarize the theory of Les 
Johnston and Clifford Shearing on the fall of the state monopoly and the rise of the nodal 
governance of security. Johnston and Shearing consider Beccaria as the representative 
theorist of the classical criminal law which has lost its monopoly on the governance of 
security. According to Johnston and Shearing, Beccaria’s dream represents the punitive 
mentality of the classical criminal law, while the nodal governance of security is the 
expression of a risk mentality, which means that the nodal governance of security is 
mainly aimed at risk reduction and not at punishment of crime. Johnston and Shearing 
consider the punishing of past behavior as an instrument to reduce the risk of harm that is 
one of the many instruments of the risk society. They are aware of the normative and 
instrumental problems of the wavering of the state monopoly. Therefore, they are looking 
for effective alternatives which will satisfy certain normative demands.
Beccaria’s dream can be used in the search for alternatives, because his dream 
contains the ideals of a just and effective governance of security. The classical state 
monopoly on the governance of security can only be lifted when the nodal alternatives 
meet the ideals of the Beccarian dream. In that sense his dream is still valid, though it 
cannot be fully realized by the criminal law. The alternative arrangements of nodal 
governance can be critically tested on the basis of Beccarian principles. When these 
arrangements cannot satisfy this critical test, that could be a reason to look for a more 
prominent place of the state in the governance of security to guarantee the Beccarian 
principles of equality, legality and proportionality.
Nodal governance
In their book Governing Security Les Johnston and Clifford Shearing argue that the state 
monopoly on the governance of security has been replaced by forms of networked 
governance in which the state, private companies and citizens work together to protect 
security. In the networks of governance the distinction between public and private forms 
of governance is blurred. The state itself is using forms of cooperation in which the state 
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companies use the services of the state, sometimes on a commercial basis, but these 
services have lost their privileged status in the sense that police activities are no longer 
considered as the main instruments to protect security. These activities are part of larger 
networks in which citizens and companies use a diversity of security instruments to 
protect themselves. They do not want to rely exclusively on state protection, but they 
want to organize their own governance of security. The state also uses a range of 
instruments and strategies which are primarily aimed at reducing security risks. The 
punishment of criminals is no longer the main instrument to protect the security of 
citizens and companies (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 13-18, 31-36, Shearing 2006).
Johnston and Shearing describe these developments in terms of security 
programmes. They make a distinction between the classical punitive program in which 
the criminal law has a central position and the modern risk program of nodal governance 
in which the state has lost its monopoly. According to Johnston and Shearing, a security 
program can be analyzed in terms of order, authority, institution, instrument, mentality 
and practice. A security program contains an order which determines what safe and 
unsafe conduct is. This order can be defined by an authority which has the power to 
announce the rules of order. Certain institutions execute the security program and use 
specific security instruments to enforce the rules of the program. From the definition of 
order by an authority and from the institutional enforcement of order a certain mentality 
can be deduced which is expressed in a practice of security governance (Johnston and 
Shearing 2003: 6-9).
The idea of a security program fits very well with the practice of the criminal law. 
According to Johnston and Shearing, this practice is the expression of a punitive 
mentality which can be deduced from the order of the criminal law en from institutions 
(police, prosecution, judiciary) which enforce the criminal law. The main instrument of 
these institutions is punishment (imprisonment, fine) which is executed in cases of crimes 
and misdemeanors. The punitive mentality is directed at behavior from the past. Criminal 
law institutions are mainly occupied with the investigation, prosecution and punishment 
of crimes which already have been committed. Punishment is determined by the 
seriousness of the crime and the personality of the perpetrator. Preventive considerations 
also play a part in the determination of punishment, and in that sense the punitive 
mentality is aimed at the future, but the main aspect of the criminal law is the fact that the 
institutions involved are handling crimes which have been committed and are in need of a 
state response (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 15, 24, 41, 48, 54, 95).
In contrast with the punitive program of classical criminal law the risk program of 
nodal governance is not primarily directed at the past, but mainly at the future: the 
reduction of harm risks. The criminal law can play a part in this reduction of risk, but the 
risk mentality of nodal governance implies that punishment is always too late, because 
the harm of crime already has occurred at the moment of punishment. Nodal governance
is aimed at the reduction of harm and therefore risk instruments are aimed at prevention, 
for instance by way of exclusion of risk groups from certain city areas or the exclusion of 
these groups from certain services. Exclusion is one of the most important risk 
instruments expressing the risk mentality. The closed gate (with a camera to observe the 
person who wants admission) is the main instrument to control risk in buildings, business 
districts and gated communities. In a more abstract form the exclusion from services is 
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2003: 81-84).
Risk programmes are more hybrid than the classical punitive program, because of 
the lack of a clear order and a central authority which defines the rules, and because the 
main institutions and instruments of risk programmes are more difficult to identify in 
society. Citizens, companies and state organizations use a diversity of security 
instruments to reduce the risk of harm, without central authorities or binding rules which 
govern all the instruments used, like “risk taxation” or “risk management” as it is 
developed by private companies which have been growing in recent years and use these 
instruments to control the risk of harm. Private security companies have become the main 
competitors to the state in the governance of security (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 84-
92).
Specific strategies are being presented by the state as classical forms of 
governance, for instance the strategy of Zero Tolerance Policing which is aimed at 
providing security in city areas. The state claims its successes with Zero Tolerance 
Policing on the basis of classical policing instruments like surveillance, but Johnston and 
Shearing argue that Zero Tolerance Policing is a form of cooperation between the state, 
private companies and citizens in which the state applies strategies aimed at risk 
reduction (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 98-116). Zero Tolerance Policing is not only 
directed at suspects of crimes, but also uses instruments like anti-social behavior orders 
and forms of preventive bodily searches. These instruments create the risk that innocent 
persons are the target of state interventions to reduce the risk of crime. The “anti-social 
behavior” is more broadly defined than the classical crimes of the criminal law and 
specific forms of surveillance can be used against persons belonging to risk groups 
without a formally defined suspicion that these persons have committed crimes.
Johnston and Shearing are aware of these problems, but they also analyze the 
positive effects of the loss of the state monopoly on the governance of security. They 
argue that as a consequence of this loss citizens can provide for their own security with 
the use of local knowledge and capacities. Johnston and Shearing give the South African 
Peace Committees as an example of these positive effects. This form of “local capacity 
policing” can be considered as the expression of a democratic ideal which holds that local 
conflicts are to be solved with local means and capacities and not with the use of state 
force (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 151-160).
Beccarian rationality
Johnston and Shearing mention the theory of Cesare Beccaria on the criminal law as an 
example of the punitive mentality which fits the classical monopoly of the state on the 
governance of security (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 42-45). According to Beccaria, 
punishment by the state is the main instrument to provide security. Beccaria was an 
Enlightenment thinker who developed his theory on crime and punishment as a protest 
against the abuse of the criminal law by the ruling sovereigns who furthered their own 
interests with state power and often acted against the interest of its citizens (Beccaria
1995: 3, 7-8, 9). Beccaria also protested against cruel treatment of suspects, unfair trials 
and harsh punishments. In his book Dei delitte e delle pene (On Crimes and 
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transfer part of their natural freedom to the state in the interest of their security. The state 
could determine what the crimes are by clearly formulated laws. When violations of the 
laws would be met by proportional punishments, the security of all citizens would be 
better protected than in a state of nature in which persons have to take care of their own 
security.
Beccaria followed Thomas Hobbes in his opinion that the state of nature is a state 
of war of all against all (Hobbes 1996). Persons in the state of nature can end this war by 
means of a social contract on the transfer of freedom to the sovereign who will protect 
their security with the power that has been transferred to him (Beccaria 1995: 9, 11, 12). 
Beccaria disagreed with Hobbes on the amount of freedom which has to be transferred in 
order to end the war in the state of nature. According to Hobbes, persons have to transfer 
all their freedom, except for the natural right to self defense. Beccaria did not want to go 
that far. According to him, persons only had to transfer as much of their natural freedom
as is necessary to protect their security. Beccaria also had a different opinion on the 
powers of the sovereign which are unlimited in Hobbes’ political philosophy. Beccaria 
followed Montesquieu in the idea that the right of the sovereign to punish would not go 
further than is necessary to protect the security of all citizens. Beccaria also was of the 
opinion that a separation of powers was necessary to limit the power of the sovereign
(Beccaria 1995: 10, 12-13).
Beccaria’s book is especially well known for its protest against torture (Beccaria
1995: 39-44), its criticism of the death penalty (Beccaria 1995: 66-72), its arguments for 
publicly known laws which clearly state the crimes, and its reasoning in favor of 
proportionate punishments (Beccaria 1995: 19-21) and fair trials (Beccaria 1995: 97-98).
Beccaria was an important propagandist for the modernization of the criminal law on the 
basis of Enlightenment principles. Beccaria also tried to improve the theory of the 
criminal law by arguing for a specific relation between rationality and normativity. He 
wanted to show that persons transfer a part of their natural freedom to the state to further 
their interest in security. The rationality of this transfer demands that individuals do not 
transfer more freedom than is necessary for the protection of their security.
Beccaria’s arguments in favour of the rationality of the criminal law and the 
social contract relate to several levels of human reasoning. The first level concerns the 
human capacity to search for pleasure and to avoid pain. Certain crimes can give pleasure 
to the perpetrator and therefore the punishment of the crime has to cause more pain than 
the pleasure of the crime (Beccaria 1995: 9, 21). People are motivated to act on direct 
impulses of their senses and therefore prompt punishment would be the most effective 
instrument against crime. Individuals are also capable of weighing the short term pleasure
of crime against the long term pain of future punishment. The time between the direct 
pleasure of crime and the pain of future punishment cannot last too long, because 
otherwise individuals would not make a psychological association between crimes and 
punishments (Beccaria 1995: 49). This is a second level of reasoning in Beccaria’s theory. 
Beccaria added a third level of rationality to the first two levels. Individuals can reason 
on a higher level of abstraction when they make decisions on the basis of written laws 
which determine what are the crimes and punishments. This third level can only function 
when the laws are clearly stated and publicly known (Beccaria 1995: 17-18). To this third 
level of reasoning a fourth level can be added which Beccaria himself did not mention 
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understands the political and legal system of which the law is a part. A person has to 
know the meaning and function of the sovereign, the laws, the crimes, the prosecution 
and the judiciary within the system in order to be able to weigh the pleasure of crime 
against the pain of punishment.
With the social contract, Beccaria added a fifth level of rationality to his theory. 
The social contract presupposes the ability of individuals to rationally compare the state 
of nature with the state under the rule of the sovereign. According to Beccaria, 
individuals will make this comparison on the basis of their rational self-interest and they 
will be able to measure the amount of freedom they will have to transfer to the sovereign 
in order to protect their security in an effective way. This fifth level of rationality raises 
certain problems, because Beccaria not only formulated a social contract theory, but he 
also used utilitarian criteria to evaluate the acts of the sovereign. Beccaria thought that 
individuals in the state of nature or under the rule of the sovereign will not reason on the 
basis of the utilitarian principle to promote “the greatest happiness shared among the 
greatest number” (Beccaria 1995: 7). They will only act on the basis of self-interest. This 
raises the problem that on the basis of their own interest, individuals may not comply 
with the law, while at the same time it is in their own interest that everybody else does
(Beccaria 1995: 10). A possible solution to this problem is rational self binding through 
the social contract and the criminal law of the sovereign. The punishment of individuals
who do not comply with the criminal law gives everybody a reason not to commit crimes. 
Parties to the social contract should be able to see the rationality of this reasoning and
also should be able to limit their freedom on the basis of this reasoning. This adds a sixth 
level of reasoning to the five levels mentioned before. The sixth level is the theoretical 
level on which individuals are able to formulate a solution to the problem of the 
contradiction between contractual self interest and utilitarian common good.1
On the basis of Beccaria’s theory, individuals can be divided in six categories. 
Some individuals can only reason on the first level of rationality in reaction to direct 
forms of pleasure and pain. Other individuals can reason on a second level and compare 
direct forms of pleasure and pain with future ones. A third category consists of 
individuals who are able to reason on the basis of the laws defining crimes and 
punishments. On a fourth level of abstraction, individuals can understand the political and 
legal system of which the laws and the punishment are a part. Some individuals are able 
to compare the state of nature with the state of the sovereign and the ability to make this 
comparison is the fifth form of rationality. The highest level of rational abstraction 
consists of reasoning to solve the contradiction between self interest and social utility. A 
person who is able to reason on the six levels of rationality has strong reasons not to 
commit crimes. According to the theory of Beccaria, a society of individuals with the 
ability to reason on all six levels of rationality will be a society with maximum security 
and maximum freedom, provided that the state will function effectively and will 
promptly and proportionally punish transgressions of the criminal law.
Beccarian explanations of crime
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constructed criminal law would be effective when the criminal law system would comply 
with principles of equality, legality and proportionality. When all citizens are capable of 
reasoning on the six levels of rationality, and when all crimes are clearly defined by the 
law and are promptly and proportionally punished by the state, the criminal law would 
make Beccaria’s dream on effectivity and normativity come true. The Enlightenment 
ideal of Beccaria was that all citizens can reach the six levels of rationality by upbringing 
and education (Beccaria 1995: 110, 105-107). According to the Enlightenment dream, the 
criminal law can provide security for all rational citizens, while the citizens transfer no 
more freedom than is necessary to protect their security. Punishment would infringe the 
freedom of citizens no more than is necessary, including the freedom of the perpetrators 
who would be punished proportionally. When citizens can reach all six levels of 
rationality, limitations on freedom by punishments will only be necessary in exceptional 
cases. The need of those limitations will increase when citizens cannot reach all six levels, 
but can only reason on the lower levels.
Beccaria’s theory can explain why the criminal law would not effectively protect 
security in certain circumstances. The explanation can be found in a failing state which 
cannot react promptly with proportionate punishments on all committed crimes. Because 
of this failure, an essential part of Beccaria’s theory of the social contract would become 
inoperative: even the most rational citizen will only comply with the criminal law when 
the threat of punishment effectively wipes out the pleasure of the crime. When 
punishment does not follow promptly after the crime, a reason to comply with the 
criminal law disappears, although it cannot be excluded that a fully rational person would 
comply to the law even when he knows that punishment will not follow promptly.2
The explanation of crime can also be found in the failed reasoning of citizens who 
are not capable to react adequately on punishments of crimes and the threat of 
punishments in the criminal laws. When these two explanations are combined, the 
criminal law could end in a complete failure according to Beccaria’s theory. When the 
state cannot react promptly to crime with proportionate punishment and citizens are not 
capable of reasoning rationally - even on the lower levels of rationality - crime rates 
would rise and society would degenerate towards a state of nature. The failing rationality 
of individuals could be caused by inadequate education or by social or psychological 
problems of perpetrators. This could be handled by other instruments than the criminal 
law, for instance programmes of reintegration based on social and psychological 
knowledge and therapeutic treatment.3 The failure of the state could be repaired by 
improving the criminal law system and its effectivity by punishing promptly to provide 
security for all citizens.
It is also possible that Beccaria’s theory is ill-founded or incomplete and that 
other explanations can be given for the rising crime rates and the failing criminal law 
system: political, economic and cultural explanations such as those given by David 
Garland in his book The Culture of Control (Garland 2001). These explanations are based 
on more general developments in society. The social and economic equality or inequality 
can be an explanation for the crime rates of a society. In her book The Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, Nicola Lacey argues that egalitarian societies react less harshly towards crime 
than societies with great economic differences without social welfare. A causal 
8relationship may exist between crime rates and the equal or unequal distribution of 
wealth (Lacey 2008).
Perhaps it is possible to amend Beccaria’s theory on crime and punishment which 
can be considered as an incomplete theory. Beccaria’s theory only deals with the 
distribution of freedom and security. A complete theory of crime would also deal with the 
distribution of other primary social goods and the relation of this distribution with the 
criminal law system. A starting point of such a criminal law theory could be A Theory of 
Justice in which John Rawls defends a general theory of the social contract (Rawls 1999).
In a society that is just according to the Rawlsian principles of justice, citizens would not 
have a reason to commit crimes to further their own interests.4 When a society does not 
meet up completely with the Rawlsian principles of justice, individuals would have more 
reason to commit crime, especially when they are the victims of injustice. Crime rates 
could be explained by the relative deprivation of individuals who are the worst off in a 
relatively unjust society, as Jock Young has argued in his book The Exclusive Society
(Young 1999). Punishment of crime would have the effect of strengthening the feeling of 
injustice of those who are being punished when the primary social goods are unequally 
and unfairly distributed in society. This explanation would add a seventh level of 
rationality to Beccaria’s theory.5
It is possible that Beccaria’s theory, amended with a seventh level of rationality, 
does not give the correct explanation of crime rates, because his theory does not 
correspond with the way human beings take decisions on committing crimes and the way 
punishments have an effect on these decisions. It may be possible that individuals
generally do not decide to commit crimes after reasoning according to Beccarian models
of rationality (or more modern theories of rational choice). Other personal and social 
factors determine the crimes people commit and the way society reacts to those crimes, 
for instance emotional and cultural factors which fall outside the scope of rational 
reasoning. I will not raise further doubts on Beccaria’s theory on rationality. My purpose 
in this article is to look for Beccarian explanations of crime and punishment and 
Beccarian explanations of alternatives to the criminal law, such as the rules, authorities, 
institutions, instruments, mentalities and practices of nodal governance. The next step 
would be to test these explanations empirically, but to be able to do that, it must be 
shown that nodal governance does not necessarily presume a completely different theory 
in comparison to Beccaria’s theory of the criminal law.
Beccarian explanations of nodal governance
When the state fails to provide the necessary security for all, individuals to a certain 
extent fall back into a state of nature in which they have to provide for their own security. 
Therefore, the rise of nodal governance could be explained and justified by the Beccarian
theory that the social contract is only effective and binding when everybody’s security is 
better protected under the criminal law than in the state of nature. When individuals are 
worse off under the criminal law, they can use other social and legal instruments to 
protect their own security as an alternative or an amendment to the Beccarian social 
contract.
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of Beccarian rationality in relation to the institutions and instruments of nodal governance. 
Beccarian reasoning would lead to the conclusion that individuals cannot completely 
depend on the criminal law of the state to provide their security. According Beccaria’s 
social contract theory, individuals do not transfer all their freedom to the state. They 
transfer no more freedom than is necessary for the protection of their security. When the 
transfer of freedom does not have the desired effect, the Beccarian social contract allows
for individuals to withhold a part of their freedom in order to protect their own security 
with legal and social instruments other than the criminal law.
From the perspective of Beccaria’s theory, nodal governance appears to be an 
intermediate state between the state of nature and the monopoly on the use of force by 
the sovereign. Individuals not only have a choice between the state of nature and the 
criminal law: they also can choose the instruments of nodal governance. There are 
gradual differences between the state of nature, the intermediate state of nodal 
governance and the criminal law of the state. From Beccaria’s theoretical perspective the 
question must be: how much freedom does a person have to transfer to the state in order 
to provide the necessary security and how much freedom does a person have to withhold 
to protect his own security? The answer to this question can be based on a Beccarian 
balancing of freedom and security to reach a maximum security with a minimum loss of 
freedom.
In his book Anarchy, State, and Utopia Robert Nozick argued that individuals in a 
state of nature do not immediately have to transfer all their freedom to the state through a 
social contract (Nozick 1974). They can use their freedom in the state of nature to start 
protection agencies on the basis of private contracts. Nozick aimed to illustrate that the 
state could rise out of a free market of private protection agencies in the form of a 
dominant protection agency or a federation of protection agencies. With this reasoning, it 
could also be argued that the free market would not necessarily result in one dominant 
agency, but in a range of protective possibilities in which the state exists alongside other 
forms of protection companies. They can offer private instruments to protect security, 
from alarm installations to surveillance services and security personnel. The Beccarian 
social contract could regulate certain instruments of security, like the criminal law and its 
institutions, on which the state has a monopoly. The social contract could also provide for 
the freedom to protect security through private arrangements. To a certain extent the 
parties to the social contract could reserve a part of their freedom for private security 
arrangements. The amount of freedom transferred or reserved could be based on a 
rational calculation of the optimum effects of the transference.
In this context the question can be raised what the status of freedom is in the 
intermediate state of nodal governance. Johnston and Shearing claim that no set of nodes 
can be given conceptual priority in a network-based approach to governance. They argue 
that the exact nature of governance is a matter of empirical enquiry (Johnston and 
Shearing 2003: 147). This point of view has been the object of critical debate in 
criminological literature. According to some authors, the state still has a central place in 
the governance of security, although the state does not provide for all instruments of 
security. The central place of the state has taken the form of “anchored pluralism” in 
which the state is the final authority on all instruments of security provided by state 
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institutions, private companies and citizens (Loader and Walker 2006, Loader and 
Walker 2007: 170-194).
Johnston and Shearing presuppose the possibility of the use of contract and 
property as instruments of security. The protection of “mass private properties” and 
“gated communities” is partly based on the rights of the owners of these properties and 
their freedom of contract. In a modern state, however, the right to property is not a 
natural right, but it is defined and regulated by the state and its laws.6 Property rights are
protected by the state in order to allow private owners to exercise these rights. The 
possibility to exercise these rights presupposes the existence of the state and the laws of 
the state which regulate private property.7
These laws also contain limitations on property rights, for instance the limitation 
that the owner of private property does not have the right to punish individuals who 
violate his property rights in the way the criminal law system can punish perpetrators. 
The owner of private property has the right to exclude individuals from the use of his 
property and to arrest violators and hand them over to the state in order to punish the 
perpetrators. These rights and limitations are defined by the laws of the state. When an 
owner transgresses these laws, he or she can become the subject of state force through 
private or public proceedings.
Freedom of contract is also a right defined by the laws of the state.8 Contracts are 
regulated by laws and these laws also mark the boundaries of the freedom of contract. 
According to private law, it is not possible to regulate the use of force by private contract. 
The use of force falls under the monopoly of the state as it is defined by private and 
public law. It is allowed to contract with private companies on surveillances, but it is not 
allowed to contract with these companies on the arrest, trial and imprisonment of 
individuals in order to protect private property.9
From the perspective of the Beccarian theory, the state monopoly on the criminal 
law could be amended with additional instruments to protect the security of individuals
and private companies. These instruments, like the freedom of contract and property 
rights, are also defined and limited by the law of the state, first of all by the monopoly of 
the state on the use of force, which excludes certain forms of coercion on the basis of 
private property or private contracts. The private law of the state regulates the legal 
powers of property owners and the freedom of contract on the security market.
Nodal governance can be analyzed as an amendment to the Beccarian theory of 
the social contract. The intermediate state of nodal governance can be placed between the 
Beccarian state which provides for security through the criminal law and the state of 
nature in which everybody has to provide for their own security in a war of all against all. 
Most instruments of nodal governance, like private contracts and property rights, 
presume the existence of the state, its monopoly on the use of force, and the laws of the 
state which regulate and limit private contracts and property rights.
The Beccarian theory on the social contract is incomplete because Beccaria 
thought that the criminal law is the only instrument to protect security. His theory of 
rational choice, however, suggests that individuals have more instruments from which to 
choose than just the criminal law. They can use their freedom to protect their security and 
they can make provisions in the social contract to reserve a certain amount of freedom to 
maximize the protection of security. The free market of private security is limited and 
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protected by the state monopoly on the use of force. On this point the free market of 
security differs from the state of nature where such a monopoly does not exist.
From the point of view of Beccaria’s theory, the question can be asked whether 
private security arrangements are effective in comparison with the security offered by the 
criminal law and whether these arrangements comply with the principles of equality, 
legality and proportionality. The order of the risk program in nodal governance is not as 
clearly stated as the criminal law, the instruments in the form of exclusive measures can 
be disproportionate in relation to the unwanted behaviour, and the effects of private 
arrangements can lead to inequality in the protection of security. Individuals and 
companies who can afford it, can effectively protect their security in gated communities 
or business improvement districts, while individuals who lack the financial means have to 
live in “no go areas” which resemble the Hobbesian state of nature. A consequence of 
nodal governance could be the growth of unsafe areas which may work to everybody’s
disadvantage.10 A possible solution to this problem could be state intervention in unsafe 
areas to protect citizens who cannot pay for their security or state subsidy of private 
arrangements for those who cannot pay them. Taxing the rich to finance security for to 
poor could also be a solution (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 111).
The best solutions according to Beccarian reasoning depend on the six or seven 
levels of rationality and on the possibilities of the criminal law and the private 
arrangements to offer effective protection. The solutions finally depend on a rational 
balancing of freedom and security and this balancing could lead to the conclusion that 
individuals should be able to use their freedom to protect their security instead of 
transferring their freedom to the state and the criminal law. But this reasoning also 
presupposes the existence of the state as the highest authority to define and limit property 
rights and contract rights. A rational theory of the social contract should not only describe 
the monopoly of the state on the use of force, but also the private freedoms of citizens 
and companies to protect their own security, based on provisions in the social contract 
and the laws of the sovereign state.
Conclusion
Both the theory on nodal governance as formulated by Johnston and Shearing, and the 
theory of Beccaria on the criminal law fall short of explaining private arrangements to 
protect security. Johnston and Shearing fail to see that private contracts and property 
rights are legal concepts which presuppose the existence of the state and its laws on 
property and contract. Johnston and Shearing have to clarify their use of concepts like 
“the authority of contract” and “mass private property” in relation to private law and the 
state monopoly on the use of force.11 Beccaria did not take into account the possibility 
that individuals can use their freedom to protect their security under the rule of private 
law. Beccaria’s theory on the rationality of individuals can be used to argue that 
individuals must have the possibility to look for a balance between private freedom to 
protect security and public protection by the criminal law of the state.
The Beccarian theory on the social contract can be amended with provisions on 
the private arrangements of individuals to protect security. These provisions can be 
constructed on the basis of the Beccarian principles of equality, legality and 
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proportionality, and also on the basis of the six or seven levels of Beccarian rationality. 
Johnston and Shearing also seem to reason from the rational interests of individuals in the 
protection of security. These interests could be specified in a theory on the rational 
choices between the different instruments and on the implementation of the Beccarian 
principles.12
It cannot be excluded, however, that Beccaria’s dream can no longer be a source 
of inspiration. In that case, alternative theoretical frameworks have to be developed to 
explain and justify nodal governance and the diminishing of state governance: individuals
are not rational in accordance with Enlightenment ideals, the state cannot meet the 
Enlightenment expectations of effectivity and normativity, and the free market of security 
has replaced the state monopoly on the governance of security. It could be disputed that 
this replacement is really an ideal situation. This intermediate state could also be a 
consequence of a failing society in which rich people retire in their “gated communities”, 
while those who cannot pay for their security, have to live in the “no go area’s” with a 
strong resemblance to the Hobbesian state of nature. As long as this situation is 
considered to be a state of avoidable failure, the Beccarian dream is still alive.
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1 The complex relation between social contract theory and utilitarianism in Beccaria’s theory is analyzed by 
Young 1983. On a more general level this relation is the subject of Hudson 2003.
2 For instance a person with the rationality of Socrates who realizes that he himself suffers the most harm of 
the crimes he will commit (Plato 1994: 46 e.f. and 78 e.f.)
3 Johnston and Shearing point out that after Beccaria the punitive program was adapted in the “neoclassical 
compromise” of criminal punishment and therapeutic reintegration (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 45-48). 
David Garland has called this adaption “penal welfarism” (Garland 2001: 27 e.f.).
4 See on the complex relation between rationality and justice Rawls 1999: 450 e.f.
5 See on the moral problem of crime and punishment in an unjust society Reiman 2007 with references to 
Rawls and to Hobbes en Locke who according to Reiman defend opposing conclusions on the moral status 
of crime in an unjust society. This explains the ambivalence in the title of his article.
6 The same problem occurs in Nozick 1974. He presupposes property rights and contract rights without the 
existence of a state. Given the complexity of these rights, it is problematic to suppose that they can be 
defined as natural rights without laws defining them. The complications of defining property rights may be 
a reason of its own to enter a social contract and to transfer ruling powers to the state.
7 This point was already argued by Rousseau in his social contract theory (Rousseau 1997: Book I, Chapter 
8 and 9).
8 Crawford calls contractual governance “regulated self-regulation” (Crawford 2003: 488). He points out 
the risks of exclusion and inequality of contractual governance (501). An important gain can be the fact that 
contractual governance is voluntary, in contrast to the punitive coercion of the state. The voluntary 
character of contractual governance can make room for restorative justice (502).
9 Johnston and Shearing call “the authority of contract” an alternative to “state-granted coercive powers” 
(Johnston and Shearing 2003: 17). They add that “the state can be called upon to use force in support of 
contracts and their property claims”, but they also state that “the governance of security is authorized 
through a variety of different, albeit related, auspices”. The legal powers of private person to make 
contractual rules on the governance of security, however, presuppose the existence of the state which 
regulates the right to property and the freedom of contract. See on these and related problems of nodal 
governance Loader and Walker 2007: 188-190 and 192-194.
10 Johnston and Shearing call the private areas of security “new feudal domains” with “private corridors”
running over the unsafe areas, for instance in the form of bridges or underground pathways between the 
safe areas (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 110).
11 Shearing seems to acknowledge this point when he accepts concepts like “rule at a distance” en “state-
anchored pluralism” (Shearing 2006: 24). But he denies the possibility of a conceptual priority of the state 
on the basis of “conceptual claims”. He argues that priority in nodal governance is an empirical matter (27, 
see also Johnston and Shearing 2003: 147). Shearing, however, does not make clear what the status of 
concepts like contract and property is. It seems to be impossible to define these concepts only empirically, 
without any reference to their legal meaning which conceptually presupposes the existence of a state and a 
legal system.
12 Beccaria’s theory of rational choice could be amended with ideas from modern rational choice theory and 
(neo)liberalism. The seventh level of rationality, which is absent in his theory, suggests that rational 
decisions on the distribution of security in society should take into account the equal moral worth of 
persons. Rawlsian rationality could be taken as a model of the way decisions on this seventh level should 
be taken. See Rawls 1999: 123 e.f. on the rationality of persons in his theory.
